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Justice Cardozo Revisited:
Phenomenological Contributions to
Jurisprudence
WILLIAM H. ROBERTS*
I
GENY INTRODUCED INTO MODERN JURISPRUDENCE the concepts of the "given"
and the "construed." Facts are "given" if they exist objectively, i.e., if man has
to accept an existing situation as a reality which his intervention cannot
change. He may use this reality as a springboard for further action; however,
he has to accept the finality of its historical or juridical existence. ' The
"given" are, then, all contingent facts of history, the present state of human or
international relations, etc.; we can constructively move forward from them,
but the "given" itself stands unmoved and unmovable, subject to perception,
knowledge and understanding, but not to change. Our perception of the
"given" will, as perception always does, depend on our point of view-on our
intention, end or purpose-on whatever layer of consciousness this intention
may be lodged. Historians will look at a fact-situation differently-depending
on their respective nationality, philosophical outlook, professional training,
etc. The same fact-situation will be viewed in a completely different light by
the lawyer-again partly depending on subjective factors similar to those
mentioned above. However, the end the lawyer has in mind (his intention)
will be an entirely different one from that of the historian. The latter will be
satisfied with perception, knowledge-and possibly an understanding-of the
fact-situation. The lawyer, on the other hand, will use it as a springboard for
*Professor of International Law and Relations, The Catholic University of America.
I GENY, LES METHODES JURIDIQUES 181-196 (1911) ; see also I GENY, SCIENCE ET TECHNIQUE
EN DROIT PRIVE POSITIF 96-100 (1914). Cf. DABIN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW IN THE LEGAL
PHILOSOPHIES OF LASK, RADBRUCH, AND DABIN 318 (1950).
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constructive action whether he is confronted with the situation in his capacity
as advocate, adviser or judge. The "given"-including already existing legal
principles, rules and norms which are part of the historical fact-situation in
which we find ourselves-are subject to our elaboration and interpretation,
i.e., to knowledge and understanding. Action based on this fact-situation
belongs to an entirely different category, to which Gny referred as "con-
strued." However, once the "construed" becomes part of objective reality, it
is as much a part of the "given" as whatever preceded it.2
A fact-situation is a group of facts connected with each other by an inten-
tion, end or purpose tying them together. "Of course facts mean nothing," an
Oxford lecturer is supposed to have remarked. His meaning really was: "A fact
means surprisingly little, unless it is related to some other facts, or its signifi-
cance is pointed out." 3 Savigny once remarked that the juristic meaning of a
fact-situation depended on taking a point of view and then selecting from that
vantage point certain facts as material and reducing others to immateriality.
He referred to this as the "juristic style," comparing it to that of a painter.4
It is, then, the underlying principle frequently appearing in the form of an
intention, purpose or end which enables us to attach meaning to facts and to
perceive a concrete fact-situation as a whole.5
This was essentially the point of view held by Cardozo when he said that
"not the origin, but the goal is the main thing.... The teleological conception
of his function must be ever in the judge's mind."6 The "given," the fact-
situation, is then actually seen in the light of an underlying philosophy
(". . . decisions are functions of some juristic philosophy;" 7) or, in the light of
a consciously willed intention, ("one wills at the beginning the result...8.8).
This has also been expressed in Chesterton's words as related by Cardozo,
namely that "... the most important thing about a man is his philosophy." 9
The choice of the desired result, or principle, in whose light the fact-situation
is to be viewed is, as Julius Stone pointed out, a pre-logical one: ". . . it neces-
sarily involves a reference to the facts and to standards of justice (however
covert) .... "10. The desired or desirable professional ends (or principles)
which make us see fact-situations in a given light are intertwined with the
2 Ibid.
P LATr, STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION 54 (1957).
'SAVIGNY, Beruf 18 (1892) as quoted in RADBRUCH, DIE NATUR DER SACHE ALS JURISTISCHE
DENKFORM 13 (1960).
5 RADBRUCH, op. cit. supra note 4, at 32-33.
6 CARDOZO, The Nature of the Judicial Process as reprinted in SELECTED WRITINGS OF
BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 149 (1947).
Frankfurter, The Early Writings of 0. IV. Holmes, Jr., 44 HARV. L. REV. 717 (1931).
'SALEILLES, as quoted by CARDOZO, op. cit. supra note 6, at 179.
o CARDOZO, Growth of the Law, op. cit. supra note 6, at 212.
" STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAw 139 (1946).
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lawyer's or judge's professional and private personality." The choice of the
principles indicates the ideological assumptions underlying the administra-
tion of the law which, as Holmes, Cardozo and Pound have pointed out, are
hidden by the traditional reluctance of the judges to disclose and discuss them
openly. 12 The materiality or immateriality of facts in a given situation is,
therefore, basically not a legal or logical but an ethical or philosophical ques-
tion.13
The "given" and the "construed" are the two aspects of contingent reality
with which man is confronted. One aspect, the "given" is designated by the
term realis which is derived from res; the other, the "construed" from actualis,
which is, in turn, derived from actus. The "given"-whether thing or fact-
situation-is res, i.e., that which con-fronts the onlooker, ob-iectum. Res, then,
is not only the thing but also the historical, i.e., completed fact-situation with
which we find ourselves con-fronted and which we have to accept as reality.14
Things and fact-situations are the very foundations of our knowledge from
which we have to proceed in shaping the future by our actions.'5 It is one of
the great shortcomings of the still prevailing Kantian and neo-Kantian
thought patterns that they, as Goethe once said, prevent us from ever reaching
the ob-ject, the res.16 Kantian and neo-Kantian schools have maintained that
man is unable to penetrate to the very essence, the nature of the res, whereas
the traditional schools of philosophic realism postulated that this was one of
the principal, if not the principal, tasks of the intellect. 17
11 "There is in each of us a stream of tendency, whether you choose to call it philosophy or
not, which gives coherence and direction to thought and action." CARDOZO, The Nature of
the Judicial Process, op. cit. supra note 6, at 109. Also: "Deep below consciousness are other
forces, the likes and the dislikes, the predilections and the prejudices, the complex of in-
stincts and emotions and habits and convictions, which make the man, whether he be litigant
or judge." CARDOZO, The Nature of the Judicial Process, op. cit. supra note 6, at 178. Cf.
ORTEGA Y. GASSET, THE MODERN THEME 20 (1961).
12 Cf. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 35-36 (1948); HOLMES, THE PATH OF LAW in COLLECTED
LEGAL PAPERS 181-84 (1920) ; CARDozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, op cit. supra
note 6, at 109.
"STONE, op. cit. supra note 10, at 189.
"It may seem a bold and reckless statement to assert that an adequate discussion of cases like
Berry v. Donovan, Adair v. United States, or Commonwealth v. Boston and Maine R. involves
the whole medieval controversy over the reality of universals. And yet, the confident assertion
of 'immutable principles of justice inhering in the very idea of free government' made by
the writers of these decisions, and the equally confident assertion of their critics that there
are no such principles, show how impossible it is to keep out of metaphysics." Cohen, The
Place of Logic in the Law, 29 HARV. L. REV. 628 (1916).
" PIEPER, DIE WIRKLIcHKEIT UND DAS CUTE 11 (1956).
15"Ipsae res sunt causa et mensura scientiae nostrae." AQUINAS, QUAESTIONES DISPUTATAE
DE POTENTIA DEI 7, 10 ad 5.
1 GOETHE, Letter of September 18, 1831, to Schultz.
17 Intellectus penetrat usque ad rei essentiam...." AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIcA 1, 11, 31, 5.
Similarly, Goethe once stated that all human action depended on the clear perception of the
res and its very nature. GOETHE, as quoted in PIEPER, op. cit. supra note 14, at 7.
[Vol. XII
Justice Cardozo Revisited
It must not be assumed that these considerations apply only to the judicial
process; they are equally important for the advocate and adviser.
The jockeying for position by advocates in stating the facts of the conflict to be
judged is a preliminary skirmish of utmost importance in the effort to persuade
the judge to see the facts legally, that is, in terms of the particular legal contexts,
so chosen that the "proper" values-those favorable to the particular advocate-
will dominate judgment. "These are the facts; is it or is it not interstate com-
merce? Is it or is it not an affair of states' rights? Is it property, or is it con-
tract?" ... To formulate the "facts" in one way and not in the other is to get one
kind of a decision and not another.'s
II
Although even the perception of res in its meaning of "thing" provides great
problems, we are here mainly concerned with the perception of res qua fact-
situation. How do we proceed in demarcating the limits of a fact-situation-
avoiding the equally dangerous errors of either establishing too narrow or too
wide a field? What facts are to be included and which ones are to be excluded
in setting up the field?
Cardozo, like others, laid stress on the intuition of the "skilled craftsman"
to establish the appropriate limits (the field) of the fact-situation. He main-
tained that we depended in law, as we do in most other intellectual disciplines
-and he singled out history-on intuition or insight ". .. transcending and
transforming the contributions of mere experience."' 9 Pound made the same
point when he referred to the fact that
The trained intuition of the judge continually leads him to right results for
which he is puzzled to give unimpeachable legal reasons.... The instinct of the
experienced workman operates with assurance.... It has been gained by long
experience which has made the proper inclusions and exclusions by trial and
error until the effective line of action has become a habit.20
What is it that the "skilled craftsman" knows and to which Cardozo and
others have referred as "intuition"? Holmes once said that a man who "has a
working knowledge of his business can spend his leisure time better than in
reading all the reported cases he has time for. They are apt to be only the
small change of legal thought." 2' In other words, the "skilled craftsman" who
has firmly grasped the principles of his art-be he a lawyer, historian, intelli-
gence analyst, etc.-will subconsciously, i.e., without conscious effort, select
18 GARLAN, LEGAL REALISM AND JUSTICE 37-38 (1941).
" CARDOZO, Growth of the Law, op. cit. supra note 6, at 225.
20 Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decisions, 36 HARV. L. REV. 951, 952 (1923).
Cf. HUTCHESON, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial De-
cisions, as quoted in COHEN AND COHEN, READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
467-472 (1951).
HOLMES, I CONTINENTAL LEGAL HISTORY SERIES xlvi (1912).
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those principles which will assist him in patterning the facts of the case in
such a way as to find a desirable solution. In patterning the facts according to
the principles selected, he will exclude and include facts and assign to them
materiality or immateriality. It is in this way, by intuitively, i.e., without
conscious effort, arriving at the right principles for patterning the facts, that
he will automatically establish the relevant field of perception, the fact-
situation, the res material to his investigation. This is what Pound meant
when he referred to "... the intuitive knowledge of the judge as to what
will achieve justice in the concrete case. .." which he will derive from his
experience and in-sight into the ratio legis.22 Max Radin in developing this
idea further pointed out that the judge first considers a certain result desirable
because of his insight that certain "jural consequences... ought to flow from
the facts." And only then, as Radin told us, does he try to make his decision
accomplish the result. The intuitive knowledge of the principles applicable
to the case is, then, our guide in establishing the appropriate field of percep-
tion.23
This is as true of law as it is of other fields of intellectual endeavor. The
mathematicians Gauss and Poincar6 relate similar methods which the latter
sums up by saying: "Most striking at first is this appearance of sudden illu-
mination, a manifest sign of long, unconscious prior work. The role of this un-
conscious work in mathematical invention appears to me incontestable." 24
Hadamard then develops the point fully by applying William James' concept
of fringe-consciousness to the finding of the correct principles for structuring
the fact-situation.25 We get a similar account from the inventor of the Diesel
engine:
An invention consists of two parts: the idea and its execution. How does the
idea originate? It may be that it sometimes emerges like a flash of lightning; but
usually after laborious searching it will hatch itself out of innumerable errors;
and by comparative study will gradually separate the essential from the non-
essential, and will slowly permeate the senses with ever greater clarity, until at
last it becomes a clear mental picture.26
The professional craftsman does not deal with the "raw" fact-situation;
probably nobody is equipped to do that. He transforms and transposes the
Pound, supra note 20, at 951.
2... . res autem naturalis mensurans et mensurata; sed intellectus noster est mensuratus,
non mensurans quidem res naturales, sed artificiales tantum." AQUINAS, QUAESTIONES DIs-
PUTATAE DE VERITATE I, 2.
"4 HADAMARD, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVENTION IN THE MATHEMATICAL FIELD 14 (1945). Cf.
WALLAS, THE ART OF THOUGHT 80, 82, 94, 96 (1926).
5 HADAMARD, op. cit. supra note 24, at 24-25
21 KLEMM, A HISTORY OF WESTERN TECHNOLOGY 342 (1959).
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"raw" situation into a legal or, as the case may be, a scientific one; it is this
situation with which he actually deals.
In its raw state, the "given" is difficult to seize for the human mind; at least
there is needed for its comprehension an operation of the intelligence which
cannot proceed without a certain more or less deforming conceptual elaboration.
In relation to the "raw fact," the "scientific fact" is "construed." Yet the whole
effort of science tends to as exact as possible a restitution of the real, naturally in
accordance with the means at the disposal of science.27
The structuring of the already existing, the "given" fact-situation is a
scientific or professional task. This is a point recently made by Merleau-Ponty
when he said that
Our relationship to the world, as it is untiringly enunciated within us, is not a
thing which can be any further clarified by analysis; philosophy can only place it
once more before our eyes and present it for our ratification.... Whether we are
concerned with the thing perceived, a historical event or a doctrine, to "under-
stand" is to take in the total intention ... the unique mode of existing.., in all
the events of a revolution... [a] certain way of patterning the world which the
historian should be capable of seizing upon and making his own. 28 .
Needless to say, the same applies to the lawyer's patterning of the "given"
fact-situation.
We have already referred to Judge Hutcheson's "judicial hunch." Although
the term seems upsetting at first sight, investigation will show that it is the
prevailing mode of perception in all great intellectual enterprise whether it
be in law, medicine, or statesmanship. 29 Intuition qua perception is nothing
else but quick identification, clear understanding and a quick ability to
interpret.
A scientific hunch is a unifying or clarifying idea which springs into conscious-
ness suddenly as a solution to a problem in which we are intensely interested. In
typical cases, it follows a long study but comes into consciousness at a time when
we are not consciously working on the problem. A hunch springs from a wide
knowledge of facts but is essentially a leap of the imagination in that it goes
beyond a mere necessary conclusion which any reasonable man must draw from
the data at hand. It is a process of creative thought.3 0
27 DABIN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 319, 342.
MERLEAU-PONTY, Phenomenology of Perception xviii (1962).
2 Cf. Cardozo's reference to Sir Austin Chamberlain's statement that "... the hunch has
been for centuries the driving force for British statesmen in international diplomacy."
C ARozo, Jurisprudence, op. cit. supra note 6, at 27.
" Platt and Baker, The Relation of the Scientific "Hunch" to Research, VIII JOUR. OF
CHEM. EDUC. 1969 (1931).
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Intuition, then, provides a synthesis and not only a rearrangement. 31 This
is exactly Gdny's point as accepted by Cardozo when he approvingly quoted
the former as saying that it was "a procedure extremely complex, and full of
delicate nuances, all penetrated with casuistry and dialectics, a constant
mixture of analysis and synthesis [emphasis added] in which the a posteriori
processes which furnish adequate solutions presuppose directions a priori,
proposed by reason and by will."3 2
It has already been indicated that the selection of the structuring principle
depends on another type of intuition: philosophical and/or ethical insight.
This type of intuition is based on tradition, observation, thinking and con-
tinuous practice. Bunge refers to it as phronesis and says that "... it would
appear to be telling us in a faint voice which alternative is the most 'reason-
able' or the most viable" one.3 3 This, in fact, is nothing else but one of the
essential aspects of prudence as understood by St. Thomas Aquinas. The
directive received from prudence is a cognitio dirigens; it is, as Caietanus said,
"activated knowledge." Prudence applies the cognition of an order of things-
general or professional-to the concrete fact-situation (cf. "juris-prudence") .34
The professional order of things and its principles are linked to a general
order of things and the principles governing that order.
The variety and diversity of the term natural law has tended to obscure the
central idea which underlies them all, that of an ultimate principle of fitness with
regard to the nature of man as a rational and social being, which is, or ought to
be the justification of every form of positive law. Such a principle under the name
of reason, reasonableness, or sometimes natural justice, is fully recognized in our
own system but the difference in terminology has tended to conceal the similarity
from English lawyers during the last century or more.3 5
And providing the link to this country, it was John Adams who wrote in 1763:
It is my settled opinion that the liberty .... honor and dignity of human nature,
the grandeur and glory of the public.., were never so skillfully and successfully
consulted as in that most excellent monument of human art, the common law of
England.
Great professionals have always assumed the existence of a body of principles
which serve as the foundation of their professional activity as well as of the
scientific knowledge on which the profession is based.
BUNGE, INTUITION AND SCIENCE 95 (1962).
82 CARDOZO, Growth of the Law, op. cit. supra note 6, at 226.
1 BUNGE, Op. cit. supra note 31, at 102.
81 Pieper, op. cit. supra note 14, at 76-77. Cf. "Prudentia applicat universalem cognitionem
ad particularia." AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-I, 49, 1 ad 1.
POLLOCK, The History of the Law of Nature as reprinted in JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL
ESSAYS 124 (1961).
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... In greater or less degree, whatever austere critics may say, practice shows it
[the system of principles] to be inseparable from any efficient administration of
justice.36
It is this body of principles to which Lord Coke referred when he said that
they "... are the fundamental points of common law and, in truth, are the
main pillars of the Commonwealth." And again in Calvin's case he referred to
these principles as "the very substance of the peculiar science of the judges."
Equally, Lord Mansfield could state in Jones v. Randall (1774) that "the law
of England depends on principles and these principles run through all
cases."
37
This mode of thinking, i.e., that the professional order of things is linked
to the order of nature, is found in all professions and is ". . . a result of
habitual application of the rules of an art until they are taken for granted." 38
III
The structuring of a fact-situation with which professionals-and particularly
lawyers-are confronted demands techniques which are based on the fact that
they are called on to deal with practical problems rather than with the
elaboration of systems of thought. However, system-thinking and problem-
thinking need different techniques.39 This does not imply that problem-
thinking is unsystematic. On the contrary, as we have pointed out, it assumes
the existence of a system; however, in the structuring of facts preceding the
attempted solution of the problem, it does not introduce all ramifications of
the system, but selects only those principles which seem to offer the best tools
for achieving the desired result.40
Aristotle and Cicero have developed complete catalogues of what they
called "topics" applicable to all different kinds of problems: literary, musical,
historico-political, legal, etc. 41 Cicero referred to these "topics" as ars in-
veniendi to be followed by the ars iudicandi.42 In other words, the "topics"
structured the "given" situation and thus presented the premises for elabora-
tion and logical conclusions. Catalogues of topics have, as Viehweg pointed
out,43 the principal importance of directing attention to the essential ques-
tions and thus of divorcing the material from the immaterial. He then exem-
mALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 159 (1958).
Cf. LORD MANSFIELD in Rush v. Cooper (1777).
MPOUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 156 (1959).
HARTMANN, Systematische Selbstdarstellung in I KLEINERE SCHRIFTEN 1-51 passim (1955).
" Id. at 2.
4 1 VIEHWEG, ToPIK UND JURISPRUDENZ 18, 20 (1953).
Id. at 22.
Id. at 23.
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plified this by referring to the earlier Roman case law system and finally
quoted Savigny as saying that it had been the particular attraction of Roman
jurisprudence to view each case as a point from which an entirely new branch
of knowledge was going to be discovered. 44
IV
One of the most important and most neglected of these jurisprudential topoi
is "the nature of things," rerum natura or-differently expressed-res ipsa.
For the legal positivist, the legal order is and can only be the result of legis-
lative will. On the other hand, the jurisprudential meaning of res ipsa (this
term and rerum natura will be promiscuously used) maintains that any type
and kind of human relations carries an inherent meaning already with it.
The topic res ipsa calls, therefore, first for the recognition of the inner
structure of a fact-situation, and then, normatively, for a legal principle, rule
or norm responsive to that structure.45 The objective end or purpose inherent
in the fact-situation, in turn, implies that we are not free to interpret such a
situation solely on the basis of subjective elements-though they will play an
important part-but on our acceptance of the fact-situation itself as some-
thing historically "given," i.e., something beyond the reach of our ability to
change it retroactively. However, the "objectivity" of the fact-situation, as we
shall see, implies also that it cannot be viewed entirely in and by itself, but
only as part of a wider order of things. This is essentially the point made by
Pound when he referred to "... the professional feeling that the common law
is the legal order of nature, that its doctrines in an idealized form are natural
law, and that its actual rules are declaratory of natural law."'46
An ontological approach to law will always show a tendency to base any
legal order ultimately on the very meaning of human nature; this, however,
implies that res ipsa must not only not be ignored but that it becomes the very
foundation of positive law. The latter, then, will be nothing else but an
elaboration of the structure of res ipsa as it reveals itself in different sets of
concrete circumstances and conditions. 47 And, continues Larenz correctly, if
and when the positive law does not measure up to res ipsa, it will be up to
legal science and the courts to direct the legislator prudently toward the
desired and desirable positive regulation. Bodenheimer recently referred to
this when he said:
"Id. at 31.
LARENZ, METHODENLEHRE DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 309 (1960). See also ESSER, GRUNDSATZ
UND NORM, 6, 346-47 (1956).
""There are times when principles and rules and concepts must be accommodated to ends,
yet there must always be remembrance of the truth that of the ends to be achieved defi-
niteness and order are themselves among the greatest and most obvious." CARDozo, Juris-
prudence, op. cit. supra note 6, at 30.
' Cf. LARENZ, op. cit. supra note 45, at 310.
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The German jurist Heinrich Dernburg once made the following observation,
"The relations of life, to a greater or less degree, contain in themselves their own
measure and their own intrinsic order. This order immanent in such relations is
called the 'nature of things.' The thinking jurist must have recourse to this con-
cept in cases where a positive norm is lacking, or where the norm is incomplete
or unclear." 48
Even neo-Kantian jurists have admitted the importance of res ipsa-though
from a different viewpoint. They have recently maintained that jurisprudenti-
ally res ipsa has no being (reality) of its own, but that it is only tied to reality;
they considered res ipsa solely as the meaning of a fact-situation in the light of
-however subjectively conceived-a legal idea injected into the situation.
Res ipsa to them is, therefore, only the ultima ratio of legal interpretation and
construction; moreover, it can be applied only if the legal idea injected is in
keeping with the already established patterns of positive law.49 What this
approach, then, amounts to is nothing else but legal positivism once removed.
Similarly, Cardozo in his teachings on the patterning of fact-situations-
however methodologically helpful-relied nearly exclusively on what will
reveal itself as purely subjective factors. Basically, he maintained that ".... the
juristic philosophy of the common law is at bottom the philosophy of prag-
matism."50 This approach is in keeping with Cardozo's acceptance of John
Dewey's basic philosophy. He quoted Dewey as saying that
... its [philosophy's] attention upon clearing up the causes and exact nature of
these evils and upon developing a clear idea of better social possibilities; in short,
upon projecting an idea or ideal which, instead of expressing the notion of
another world, or some far-away unrealizable goal, would be used as a method of
understanding and rectifying specific social ills.
To this Cardozo remarked:
What is this but to say that the sociological method, which is making itself felt in
law, is at work in other fields, and even on those exalted planes which philosophy
has reserved as her own peculiar province?51
Cardozo was aware of the fact that it had been a debate of long standing
" BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE 308 (1962). Cf. GENY, II METHODE D'INTERPRETATION 82-93
(1932), as partly translated in THE SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD 11-15 (1917).
10 Cf. RADBRUCH, op. cit. supra note 4, at 15, for an elaboration of the neo-Kantian approach
to res ipsa.
50 CARDOZO, The Nature of the Judicial Process, op. cit. supra note 6, at 149. Cf. HARPER,
Some Implications of Juristic Pragmatism, 39 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS 28 (1929) :
"Pragmatically viewed, however, justice, as we meet it in the courts, assumes the appearance
of a concept open at both ends with a membership list of rights and pressures that is
constantly changing."
51 CARDOzo, Growth of the Law, op. cit. supra note 6, at 244.
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"... whether the norms of right and useful conduct, the patterns of social
welfare, are to be found by the judge in conformity with an objective or a
subjective standard."'5 2 The conclusion at which he arrived was that "so far as
the distinction has practical significance, the traditions of our jurisprudence
commit us to the objective standard."53 However, for Cardozo the "objective
standard" was nothing else but the "...customary morality of right minded
men and women....-54
Needless to say, questions as to the nature of the "right-minded man" may
be raised. Supposedly, he is the average individual who abides by ". .. the
dominant standard of right conduct.... My own notion is that he would be
under a duty to conform to the accepted standards of the community, the
mores of the times." 55 This objective standard is for Cardozo a manifestation
of "objective or general conscience" which, however, in the practical ad-
ministration of justice "takes the color of the subjective mind," or, as he said
again, "The personal and general mind and will are inseparably united."'5
The latter approach, however, as Cardozo himself admitted, seemed to lead to
"a jurisprudence of mere sentiment or feeling. '57
The essential characteristic of what Cardozo considered to be the objective
approach was that it was "constantly brought into relation to objective or
external standards... ."s The "objective," then, meant "external." And what
is this "external" standard-tempered by the predilections or the "philosophy"
of the judge? It is the method of sociology-the development of the law
"... along the lines of justice, morals and social welfare, the mores of the
day... ."59 And this method of sociology was supposed to give the judge the
power to fill in the gaps by putting "emphasis on the social welfare." 60 How-
ever, in the next paragraph Cardozo avoids being tied down to an explanation
of his terminology by giving it so wide a meaning that he himself admitted it
to be "indefinable" and by referring to it as "Kultur."'6 Since Cardozo ad-
mitted to have borrowed this term from Kohler, we shall have to turn to the
latter to find out what Cardozo actually meant by it introducing this term. He
meant the greatest possible development of human knowledge and of human
control over nature.62
2 CARDOZO, Nature of the Judicial Process, op. cit. supra note 6 at 151.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Id. at 152.
Id. at 153.
Id. at 151.
Ibid.
Id. at 117.
10 Ibid.
61 Id. at 135.
6 KOHLER, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 22 (1921).
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Mankind constantly progresses in culture in the sense that permanent and
cultural values are produced; and that man becomes more and more god-like in
knowledge and mastery of the earth. Only when based on this foundation can the
requirements of the law be recognized as the requirements of the advancing
culture which the law is to serve; and only in this way can the true aim of the law
be known for what it is.63
To this statement Allen remarks:
But in this Hegelian conception there certainly resides a supreme law in the
principle of evolution, progress, or culture; though jesting Pilate may well ask,
"What is culture?" And may well question whether man's knowledge and mastery
of the earth have necessarily made him "god-like." Social and moral history since
1914 hardly encourage that comfortable belief.64
And a German critique referred to the ". . . historical-cultural concept which,
neutral as to values, embraces scientific truth and scientific error."65 Kohler
advocated the use of sociological interpretation in codified as well as in case
law systems, i.e., "as if they [statutes] were the products of the entire people of
which the legislator was but the organ."6 6 The "objective" standard of social
welfare, as used by Kohler and Cardozo, reveals itself as a quasi-Hegelian
objective spirit which manifests itself in the legal consciousness of the com-
munity. In other words, this means that the onward march of the objective
spirit in time is bound to find expression in the general trends of judicial
opinions handed down in the course of any given historical period.67 How-
ever, it has been correctly pointed out that the collective consciousness on
which Cardozo depended is nothing else but the consciousness of individuals;
and this, as the observer remarked, is inadequate. What does this mean? It
means that whatever presents itself as the mores of our times, social welfare,
etc., is nothing else but the individual opinion of those who happen to make
public policy.68
Cardozo, then-though to a lesser degree than the other advocates of the
sociological school-reveals himself as a transcendental idealist who, together
with Emerson and Whitman, accepted Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel as
"the illustrious four." The superficial realist, as which Cardozo now appears,
is, therefore, nothing else but an idealist-an identification which applies to
all neo-realists in the philosophico-social sciences, including jurisprudence.
KOHLER, as quoted by ALLEN, Op. cit. supra note 36, at 25.
ALLEN, op. cit. supra note 36, at 25.
RADBRUCH, op. cit. supra note 4, at 203.
KOHLER, Judicial Interpretation of Enacted Law in THE SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD 189
(1917).
67 Cf. LARENZ, op. cit. supra note 45, at 193.
eg HARTMANN, op. cit. supra note 39, at 33-34.
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And being an idealist, Cardozo's "objective" standards do not stand up to
severe analytical tests. They reveal themselves as being tainted by the philo-
sophical and political preferences of the observer.
Harlan Fiske Stone, on the other hand, pointed out that sociological juris-
prudence and the common law approach were mutually exclusive of each
other when he held that:
As a principle of judicial decision consciously adopted and applied, certainly
nothing can be more foreign to the spirit of the common law and certainly
nothing could be more destructive of its essential qualities. Social jurisprudence,
as thus defined, is really a theory of legislation.., based upon his [the legislator's]
observation of what social conditions will be in the future and his particular
theories for improving them. It is not the function of the judge to listen to the
newest thing in social welfare .... 69
Positively, Stone had this to say:
The judge.., is guided by the principles of common law. In determining those
principles by the method which we have described, the duty of the judge should
be that of the patient investigator and seeker for scientific truth. To that ex-
tent, at any rate, he is a discoverer, and the rule which he discovers is a rule which
is profoundly influenced, if not controlled.., by established principles of law.
[emphasis added]. 70
On another occasion Stone pointed out that "the old sense of certainty has
gone, and judicial decisions take on the experiential quality of life itself." 71
V
Depending on whether we are confronted with the task of perceiving or
changing the "given," its "field" will be de-limited and structured by the
intentions, ends or purposes chosen as the most desirable ones. However,
what are the standards by which this desirability is measured?
Several types of such standards have been developed in the course of
Western thought: (a) the physical, biological, psychological, or social de-
terminism or quasi-determinism which prevails in the jurisprudence of in-
terests and in sociological jurisprudence; (b) subjective idealism or goal
purposefulness which either avowedly or unavowedly denies the existence or
the practical importance of a reality and value structure transcending the
sub-human and humanly construed "given"; (c) the types of purportedly
STONE, LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION 46 (1915).
o Id. at 23.
7 MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE 778-779 (1956).
[Vol. XII
Justice Cardozo Revisited
objective realism which, however, maintain that the structure of ultimate
reality and the structure of ultimate values do not necessarily coincide; in
other words, that ultimate values are to be found on a different ontic layer
from that of ultimate reality. Here the structure of final reality and final
values, though transcending the human situation, do not necessarily coincide.
And finally, (d) objective realism which maintains that the structure of
ultimate reality and ultimate values coincide with each other (ens et bonum
convertuntur) .
The first two types are nominalistic in structure, i.e., they deny the reality
of universals. The third type, though admitting their reality, still introduces
a degree of ultimate relativity by divorcing the ens from the bonum. It is only
the fourth type which provides a truly objective foundation for evaluation
and for the establishment of ends and purposes. It has been maintained that
the third, and certainly the fourth, approach lead back to metaphysics which,
nominalism and relativistic realism maintain, seemed to have been definitely
and finally buried.
Res is the ob-iectum, that with which man is con-fronted, the reality which
for him is the "given." Res ex- (s) ists; it is, as Heidegger has shown, the truth
(c-XOEta) which uncovers itself by stepping out of the shadows into the
limelight of reason. 72 Thus, he arrives at the conclusion that truth is the
adaequatio intellectus et rei.73 This, in other words, is a restatement of St.
Augustine's insight that "truth is what demonstrates that is." 74 Res, the
ob-iectum-existing independently of man's will and thought-is the essential
"given" from which he has to proceed.
In applying these basic ideas to jurisprudential thought, G~ny pointed
out that:
It is not enough merely to consider and analyze in detail all the facts of the life
of our society, to observe the mutual relations, to discern how they reciprocally
react upon each other. We must also boldly rely upon our moral consciousness
and our reasoning powers, and by use of these faculties trace the laws which
govern these phenomena.75
This is squarely in keeping with the idea of professionalism as expressed by
Pound.76
As far as legal categories are concerned, however, what actually is the
nature of res? Its history as a legal category started with Cicero's attempt to
72 HEIDEGGER, PLATONS LEHRE VON DER WARHEIT 32 (1954).
7Id. at 26.
74 ST. AUGUSTINE, DE VERA RELIGIONE 36.
75 GENY, JUDICIAL FREEDOM OF DECISION in THE SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD 14 (1917).
76 Supra at 99.
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adapt Lucretius' rerum natura to juristic thought. By way of Justinian's
Digests and Aquinas' teachings, the legal concept of res reached Montesquieu.
Radbruch pointed out that the term rerum natura had been used in modern
legal science by all major jurisprudential schools, specifically in Catholic legal
theory with its insistence on the fact that human actions are regulated by the
rational norm which can be deduced from the nature of things.77
It is, then, the avowedly or unavowedly accepted standards of the on-
tological and value structure which are the principal instruments in evalu-
ating and shaping a situation-and thus in de-limiting and structuring the
"field" of the fact-situation.
The concept of rerum natura is, therefore, equally meaningless in any of
the first three types of standards. In the nominalistic approaches, the contours
of the res will be so fluid that it will be well-nigh impossible to establish the
limits of the situation, and therefore, a meaningful structure. The res as well
as its natura will escape the observer and, to quote Goethe,
He who would study organic existence
First drives out the soul by rigid persistence.
Then the parts in his hand he may hold and class,
But the spiritual link is lost, alasl
In relativistic realism, the basic difficulty will stem from the divorce of being
and value, i.e., the assumption that the structuring principles and the "given"
are to be found on different ontic layers. Here, it still remains an open
question to determine the standards which are to be applied to bring these
two layers into conformity with each other. A lucky coincidence here and
there is no evidence for the effectiveness of this approach. The various ele-
ments of relativistic realism can only merge if the individual is assumed to be
primarily a creature of his physical or social environment. However, it is
exactly this point which leads back to a glorified type of subjective idealism
and, therefore, ultimately to a nominalistic-materialistic attitude, a develop-
ment which, by the way, was exemplified by Max Scheler's life and writings.
If rerum natura is to be a meaningful concept, it can be such only within
the framework of a philosophy of objective realism. To employ the concept
outside of such a framework has and can only lead to confusion and mis-
conceptions. However, at this point we are confronted with the problem
of linking the cognitive and constructive task of the law-maker or jurist to the
structure of ultimate reality.
The structure of final reality is characterized by the fact that ens (being) and
bonum (value) are identical with each other. However, how does contingent
11 RADBRUcH, DnE NATUR DER SACHE ALs JURISTISCHE DENKFORM 6 (1960).
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reality emerge from this structure? Man himself, in his basic make-up, is part
of ultimate reality, capable of understanding in various degrees its end and
structure-and thereby also its hierarchy of values. However, part of man's
make-up and, therefore, part of ultimate reality are also his passions, emotions,
and will. He is, therefore, individually and collectively free to perceive,
evaluate and structure contingent reality on the basis of any value system he
sees fit to employ. (Man's responsibility for the choice of the correct on-
tological and value system is not part of this investigation.) And it is at this
point that the attraction of the proximate and contingent, the attraction of
immediate over long-range interests, the attraction of physically, biologically,
or psychologically determining factors will in most cases outweigh the greater
stability and security which can be derived from an attempt to establish a
meaning of the fact-situation (res ipsa) within the framework of a wider
objective order. These are the historico-psychological roots for using primarily
values inherent in the proximate and material factors in de-limiting the
"field"-as well as in evaluating and shaping the fact-situation. The average
observer will always tend in the direction of shaping the "field" in the light
of proximate and material, i.e., essentially quantifiable considerations. He
will tend to shrink from using a higher and wider order in which the principles
for structuring res ipsa can be found. This will partly be due to the pressure
of time, business, etc. which will not allow for more than the consideration of
immediate material factors.
Part of the concrete fact-situation will always be the human "given," i.e.,
a historical situation. Therefore, any concrete application of principles of
traditional natural law will have to take the concrete historical situation into
consideration.7 8 It is in this connection that Utz refers to Aquinas' insistence
on the fact that practical reason is differently structured from speculative
reason since it is directed toward knowledge and understanding of a concrete
situation. However, Utz continues, the concrete "ought" inherent in res ipsa,
changes as historical conditions and circumstances vary. It is, therefore, he
concludes with Aquinas, obvious that the veritas practica (the concrete
"ought") is changeable and changing in accordance with prevailing condi-
tions. However unchangeable the general principles of natural law are, there
exists also, what Utz calls a changeable natural law, i.e., human institutions
and even positive law which can be considered to be directly derived from
natural law as long as rational analysis proves that a human institution or
norm conforms to res ipsa.7 9
It is, then, the cognitive rather than the normative aspect of traditional
78 UTZ, Wesen und Begriindung des Rechts in 8 FREIBURGER ZEITSCHRIFT FfiR PHILOSOPHIE
UND THEOLOGIE 66 (1961).
7Id. at 67. Cf. DABIN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 422-423.
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natural law, i.e. the individually and historically changing scope of man's
participation in the general order of things (eternal law) which will provide
the jurist as well as any other professional man with the only available tools
to de-limit, shape, and structure a concrete fact-situation. 80
Although objectively unjustified, such an opportunity will also seem to
prevail at least temporarily whenever a general ontological order (as dis-
tinguished from an order based on process or "becoming") is assumed; pro-
vided, however, that it offers sufficient latitude in the scope of man's cognitive
participation depending on variations of individual or collective (historical)
capability.
VI
The professional perception and the structuring of the "field" of fact-situa-
tions has to be accomplished in a spatio-temporal framework of contingencies.
Modern thought, i.e., certain selected aspects of phenomenology, have fur-
nished us with great insights into the nature of the processes involved as well
as with invaluable new techniques. The applicability of either to our problems
has remained widely, if not completely, unnoticed. Equally, the professional
application of these phenomenological aspects to fact-situations in the psycho-
therapeutic field has so far hardly received the attention it deserves. It has
recently been remarked that: ".... phenomenology can be practised and identi-
fied as a manner or style of thinking, that it existed as a movement before
arriving at complete awareness of itself as a philosophy. '" 8'
The aspects of phenomenology of interest to our investigation have been
clearly established by Merleau-Ponty. They are: (1) "That it [phenomen-
ology] is a matter of describing, not of explaining or analysing"; (2) that it is
a "return to the 'things themselves,' " i.e., to res ipsa. Merleau-Ponty puts it
this way:
I cannot conceive of myself as nothing but a bit of the world, a mere object of
biological, psychological, or sociological investigation.... All my knowledge of
the world, even my scientific knowledge, is gained from my own particular point
of view, or from some experience of the world without which the symbols of
science would be meaningless. The whole universe of science is built upon the
world as directly experienced, and if we want to subject science itself to rigorous
scrutiny and arrive at a precise assessment of its meaning and scope, we must
begin by reawakening the basic experience of the world of which science is the
second-order expression. Science has not and never will have, by its nature, the
8o MERLEAU-PONTY, op. cit. supra note 28, at viii.
81Id. at viii-xiv passim. Cf. Savigny, Vom Beruf Unserer Zeit fiir Gesetzgebung und Rechts-
wissenschaft 89 (1914) regarding the view of earlier Roman jurists whose greatness, as that
of early common law jurists, lay in their phenomenological approach.
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same significance qua form of being as the world which we perceive, for the
simple reason that it is a rationale or explanation of the world. (viii)
[3] To return to things themselves is to return to that world which precedes
knowledge, of which knowledge always speaks, and in relation to which every
scientific schematization is an abstract and derivative sign-language.... (ix)
[4] The world is there before any possible analysis of mine, and it would be
artificial to make it the outcome of a series of syntheses which link, in the first
place sensations, then aspects of the objects corresponding to different perspec-
tives, when both are nothing but products of analysis, with no sort of prior
reality. (x)
[5] The real has to be described, not construed or formed. Which means that
I cannot put perception in the same category as the syntheses represented by
judgments, acts, or predications. (x)
[6] The real is a closely woven fabric. It does not await our judgment before
incorporating the most surprising phenomena.... Perception is not a science of
the world, it is not even an act, the deliberate taking up of a position; it is the
background from which all acts stand out, and is presupposed by them. The
world.., is the natural setting of, and field for, all my thoughts and all my
explicit perceptions. (x, xi)
[7] It is because we are through and through compounded of relationships
with the world that for us the only way to become aware of the fact is to suspend
the resultant activity, to refuse it our complicity.... Not because we reject the
certainties of common sense and a natural attitude to things.., but because...
they are taken for granted, and go unnoticed, and because in order to arouse
them and bring them to view, we have to suspend for a moment our recognition
of them. (xiii)
[8] The philosopher.., is a perpetual beginner, which means that he takes
for granted nothing that men, learned or otherwise, believe they know. (xiv)
[Paragraphing added.]8 2
Probably the most important aspect of phenomenology which is of interest
to this investigation is that of "intention." This concept which to a certain
degree seems to replace value and topic as the cognitive and structuring ele-
ment maintains that fact-situations are perceived qua situations only if our
consciousness--deliberately or not-is directed toward them. In other words,
consciousness-in the widest meaning of this term-defines the "field"-fuzzy
at the edges and ever clearer as we move toward the center. However, con-
sciousness is not a freewheeling agent, but it is influenced by intention, i.e.,
by assigning the center of the stage of consciousness at a certain moment in
time and in a given situation to "something" the observer considers important
(value element). The assignment of intentions in the concrete case is not an
isolated instance but is deeply embedded in the observer's life history (in-
82 SZILAsI, EINFOHRUNG IN DIE PHXNOMENOLOGIE EDMUND HUSSERLS 14-24 (1959).
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dividual and/or collective). It is, then, part of his individual and collective
past, of the present situation he finds himself confronted with, and also of the
hope and expectations he holds (individually or collectively) of the future.8 3
The observer, in keeping with his life history (individual, collective, or
professional), as well as with his philosophical make-up assigns the center
of the stage to a group of facts which he deems most important when con-
fronted with a situation. This is not a psychological act, but an act inherent
in the total make-up (the constitution) of the individual or collective observer.
The intention pre-dates and precedes, therefore, the psychological act of
perception. Cardozo would probably have referred to it by repeating his
dictum that the goal is the very beginning. It is, therefore, the constitutional
make-up of the observer (physiological, biological, psychological, professional,
philosophical and collective) as it has developed in his life-history up to
the point of observation which predates intention.8 4 However, if organic
or other factors should have arrested the development of the make-up or
telescoped it, intention will be centered either on by-gone or expected situa-
tions-leading respectively to melancholy or mania, individually or col-
lectively. Or the faulty make-up may lead to an escape from reality (schizo-
phrenia) in which an attempt will be made to build a new world correspond-
ing to the make-up of the observer. Szilasi pointed out that secure human
existence-we may add, individually as well as collectively-depended on un-
reflected, unproblematic and practically unobserved predictability.8 5 Bins-
wanger then came to the conclusion that, as far as the individual is concerned,
a break in the chain of predictability-specifically because it becomes a matter
of reflection, observation or becomes problematic-will lead to psychotic in-
cidents-since the constitutive factors of the life-history of the patient will
have been uprooted. The individual will find the future unpredictable and
will react by retreating into the past, by denial of the possibility of a future or
by taking flight into a reality of his own.
In the normal course of events the constitutional make-up of the collective
(whether it be the nation, one of its territorial or functional, primarily profes-
sional, sub-groups, etc.) will be such that in a situation confronting the
particular group, intentions will be similarly directed. This will lead to the
perception of an identical or similar "field." This is, as Binswanger has
pointed out, the phenomenological basis of inter-subjectivity (i.e., the con-
stitution of a world common to the group) which, in our opinion, is but the
first step in the direction of an objective realism.8 6
83 VII HUSSERL, ERSTE PHILOSOPHIE (1923/24) 256-261 (1956).
BINSWANGER, MELANCHOLIE UND MANIE 136 (1960).
15 Id. at 74.
16 NEWMAN, A GRAMMAR OF ASSENT 86, 87 (1955).
[Vol. XII
1963] Justice Cardozo Revisited 111
If we attempt to pierce through the modern terminology of our authors, we
arrive at observations which, in various ways, were already made by Plato, St.
Augustine and Newman. It was Plato, and even before him Protagoras, who
maintained that the politike arete was essentially the acceptance of a belief
system which enabled the group to see (theorein), to understand and thereby
to structure essential situations alike. The same point was repeatedly made by
St. Augustine when he referred to the fact that it was necessary to believe in
order to know (credo ut intellegam). Newman took a similar position when
he said that
Real Assent, then, or Belief, as it may be called .... does not lead to action; but
the images in which it lives, representing as they do the concrete, have the power
of the concrete upon the affections and passions, and by means of these indirectly
become operative.... However, on the whole,... we shall not.., be very wrong
in pronouncing that ... acts of Belief, that is of Real Assent, do (not necessarily,
but do) affect it [action]. 87
And again:
After all, man is not a reasoning animal; he is a seeing, feeling, contemplating,
acting animal.... It is very well to freshen our impressions and convictions from
physics, but to create them we must go elsewhere.88
Similarly, the great political thinkers of the nineteenth century-conserva-
tives as well as socialists-maintained that every great political question was
basically a question of belief.
It has already been established that the principal elements in de-lineating
the "field" of a fact-situation are those introduced without our being con-
sciously aware of them. These elements are not found in the norms (legal or
otherwise) themselves but in the principles standing behind these norms.
The de-lineation and structuring of a problem is, therefore, dependent on the
principles prevailing in the collective and/or individual order within which
the attempt takes place. Goodhart referred to this point when he said that
"... the facts of a case are [not] a constant factor, that the judge's conclusion
is [not] based upon the fixed premise of a given set of facts ... "89
Facts are relative depending on the facts "we are talking about.... The
judge, therefore, reaches a conclusion upon the facts as he [emphasis added]
sees them." In concluding his article, Goodhart, then, established that the
"principle of the case is found by taking account (a) of the facts treated by the
judge as material, and (b) his decision as based on them."
87 Id. at 90.
Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L. J. 161, 168, 169 (1930).,
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The essential problem of the cognitive process-specifically, the professional
one-is, therefore, that of the nature of the structuring principles of the
particular civilization, nation, profession, etc. The "field" and its delimitation
will, therefore, be a different one depending on the purpose of the "field"
(legal, political, etc.) and on the principles the observer can and will use in
structuring it. It is, then, the available and applicable principles which are
the principal tools in of perceiving and structuring a fact-situation.
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